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Abstract
One of the central lessons learned from the Great Depression was that adjusting
government spending each year to balance the budget increases the volatility of output.
We compare this policy with one that involves running temporary deﬁcits and surpluses
and an average budget balance of zero. Our analysis allows monetary policy to adjust to a
change in ﬁscal regime, and the speciﬁcations for aggregate demand and supply are con-
sistent with the “new neoclassical synthesis.” Our results give only limited support to the
conventional wisdom on ﬁscal rules and stability of output.
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1. Introduction
For many years following World War II, macroeconomists have taught students the
advice of John Maynard Keynes: that we should use ﬁscal policy as a mechanism to help
balance the economy, not the budget, each year. The idea is to run deﬁcits during years
when actual output is less than the natural rate and to run surpluses in the years when
output exceeds the natural rate. It is thought that this counter-cyclical policy can be
pursued—without causing an explosion in the debt-to-GDP ratio—as long as the natural
rate of output is measured in such a way that we witness “overheated” periods about as
often as we do periods of “excess capacity.”
This strategy has been hailed as one of the truly central and important lessons that
we have learned from the Great Depression. At that time, unbalanced annual budgets were
assumed to be evidence of irresponsible policy. But, since then, we have come to consider
a ﬁxation with annual targets for balanced budgets an irresponsible approach. After all, if
private demand falls, lowering overall output and therefore tax revenue, a cut in
government spending would further reduce demand and therefore magnify the size of the
initial recession. The Keynesian message is that the budget should be balanced over the
duration of one full business cycle, not in each and every year. The widespread acceptance
of this view is indicated by a recent editorial in the Economist magazine (25 August 2001,
p13), in which Europe’s stability pact which sets a binding ceiling of 3 per cent of GDP on
euro-area countries’ budget deﬁcits, is criticized. The editorial states that “as the euro area
faces the possibility of its ﬁrst recession . . . the stability pact must not only preclude any
ﬁscal easing but even trammel the operation of ﬁscal ‘automatic stabilizers.’ That could
mean that these countries are required to increase taxes or cut public spending even as2
their economies slow. That smacks of 1930s-style self-ﬂagellation.”
Given the widespread acceptance of the standard view, it is surprising that
evidence to support it has been fairly hard to ﬁnd. Some empirical work focuses on the
efﬁcacy of built-in stabilizers in structural models of national economies (Gorbet and
Helliwel 1971, Hairault, Henin, and Portier 1997), and other work considers the relative
performance of U.S. states that have stringent rules for balanced budgets (Alesina and
Bayoumi 1996, Millar 1997). Some recent research has reassessed the empirical work. For
example, Levinson (1998) considers just large U.S. states, on the assumption that changes
in ﬁscal regime can matter only for large economies. The evidence is that ﬂexibility in the
budget deﬁcit reduces the volatility of output by very little. Others—for example,
Christiano (1984), Cohen and Follette (2000), and Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)—have
reassessed the theory behind (and empirical support for) Ricardian equivalence, since it is
important for understanding whether the tax system can be expected to impart “built-in
stability” to the macroeconomy. In this paper, we focus on the expenditure side of the
budget; we assess whether recent advances in macro modelling practices support or
threaten the Keynesian view that spending should not be adjusted over the cycle to balance
the budget at each point in time.
To make this comparison stark, we investigate two cases that are polar opposites:
Keynesian and Hoover. In the Keynesian case, both taxes and program spending are held
constant forever (as proportions of GDP) at levels that would balance the budget if it were
not for the stochastic shocks and the model’s short-run dynamic features. This ﬁscal set-up
ensures that there is no long-run trend in the debt-to-GDP ratio, and that the temporary
budget deﬁcits and surpluses are ﬁnanced entirely by short-run variations in the quantity3
of government bonds outstanding. Macroeconomic instability is avoided on the
assumption that the underlying (exogenously determined) trend growth rate in real output
exceeds the after-tax real interest rate paid on government bonds.
In the Hoover case, the budget is balanced at every instant, so the bond stock never
changes, even in the short run. The government allows the level of program spending to
vary by whatever it takes to meet this rigid rule for a balanced budget. One might argue
that our comparison involves a “straw man,” since the Hoover case involves more rigidity
than what is typically contemplated in actual economies. For example, the ﬁscal rule
passed by legislatures is often limited to a stipulation that the government never incur a
deﬁcit. Such a rule can be obeyed, with ﬁscal policy still playing what is intended to be a
stabilizing role, if the government runs a surplus on average (with a higher surplus during
booms and a lower surplus in recessions). But such a strategy is not likely to be observed,
since an ongoing budget surplus implies a negative government debt in the steady state. In
any event, by relying on the strong polar case (and thereby “stacking the cards” against the
non-Keynesian option), we have made it all the more interesting that, often, we ﬁnd no
increase in the volatility of output in the Hoover case.
What makes this unconventional result possible? One possible explanation is that
our model involves a standard propagation mechanism: temporarily sticky prices. With
this dynamic feature, a change in the ﬁscal regime can affect the speed of adjustment in
the overall economy. In particular, shocks can involve increased persistence when the
Keynesian approach is followed. Thus, while the Keynesian strategy can reduce the size of
a recession initially, it can make the recession last longer. With forward-looking behaviour
in the determination of both private demand and price-setting behaviour, the negative4
dimension of this dynamic trade-off becomes important.
A second feature in our models that could explain this unconventional result
involves the interaction between ﬁscal and monetary policy. Monetary policy is modelled
by deriving the rule for setting the interest-rate that is appropriate for meeting the central
bank's goal, taking the rest of the macro model as the bank's constraint. Because the
operation of ﬁscal policy is part of the system, monetary policy adjusts when the ﬁscal
regime changes. The central bank’s objective—assumed here to be either an expected
future inﬂation rate of zero or an expected price level that is constant—is independent of
changes in the ﬁscal regime. But, given this independence, the central bank’s
period-by-period decision rule is dependent on the ﬁscal regime. In particular, because the
Hoover approach to ﬁscal policy avoids the longer-term, slower adjustment speed noted in
the last paragraph, the central bank ﬁnds it appropriate to react less aggressively to
expected short-term developments in the economy. Traditional analyses of government
spending rules have not allowed for such an endogenous reaction of monetary policy.
Again, forward-looking agents with model-consistent expectations magnify the
importance of this adjustment in monetary policy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain the structure
of our standard “new synthesis” model. The results and two sensitivity tests are described
in sections 3 and 4 respectively. Concluding remarks are offered in section 5.5
2. The Macro Model
In this section, we explain the structure of the closed-economy macroeconomic
model that we use to defend the points made in section 1. The model involves rational
expectations, and reasonable microeconomic foundations have been provided. It
represents the current mainstream framework for analytical work on stabilization policy.
The model is deﬁned below with the variables explained immediately following equation
(9).
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The variables are:
stock of indexed government bonds outstanding at the end of each period,
measured as a proportion of trend GDP, ; because each bond is a
promise to pay one unit of purchasing power per year, also denotes real interest
payments on the debt (measured as a proportion of trend GDP).
expectations operator, based on information available at the point in time denoted
by the time subscript
government spending on goods and services, measured as a proportion of trend
GDP
proportional income tax rate
time subscript
logarithm of the price level; the ﬁrst difference of  is the inﬂation
rate
nominal interest rate ( is the full-equilibrium value of both the nominal and real
interest rates, since full-equilibrium inﬂation is zero)
stochastic demand and supply shocks; the , and parts have zero means,
constant variances, no serial correlation, and no covariance
real output, measured as a proportion of trend GDP
the natural rate—the level of real output that is sustainable in full equilibrium
(measured as a proportion of trend GDP)
The slope coefﬁcients (the Greek letters) are all positive; , and lie between zero and
one.
Equation (1) is the expectational IS relationship. In addition to a demand shock,
aggregate demand depends inversely on the real rate of interest and the expected change in
government spending, and positively on expected future output. McCallum (1995),
McCallum and Nelson (1999), and Kerr and King (1996) have argued that the traditional
B












IS relationship should be replaced by this one because it embodies an explicit theory of
household behaviour—the Ramsey (1928) consumption function:
.
If the rate of time preference for the representative agent is b (which makes the
full-equilibrium pre-tax interest rate, , equal ) and the instantaneous utility
function involved in the intertemporal optimization is , this equation is a
linear approximation of the appropriate ﬁrst-order condition, as long as a is interpreted as
the mean value of consumption. It is common (see, for example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
1999 and Woodford 1999) to base the demand side of policy-oriented macro models on
this theory.
If the production side of the economy is ignored (that is, if we consider an
endowment economy, as in McCallum and Nelson 1999 and Kerr and King 1996), this
consumption function can be combined with the standard resource constraint:
.
Equation (1) follows from substituting equation (7) and the Ramsey consumption function
into the forward ﬁrst-difference of the resource constraint.
Equation (2) deﬁnes the supply side of the model. It follows the preferences of
many modern business-cycle analysts by assuming Calvo's (1983) speciﬁcation of sticky
prices (see for example, Goodfriend and King 1997, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999, and
King 2000). Calvo's model involves forward-looking ﬁrms that face a constant probability
of being able to adjust prices. Equation (2) involves a common simpliﬁcation (see, for
example, Roberts 1995) that the coefﬁcient on expected future inﬂation is unity.
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By combining the expectational IS relationship and this “New Keynesian Phillips
Curve,” we ensure that our analysis embraces what Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) call
the new paradigm. The new paradigm retains much of the empirical applicability of the
traditional expectations-augmented IS-curve/Phillips-curve structure, yet it has the added
advantage of being more thoroughly grounded in dynamic general equilibrium theory.
King (2000), who is among the pioneers of this new approach, has warned that, given the
compact nature of this new generation of IS-curve/Phillips-curve models, it may still be
prudent to restrict their use to illustrating already-known results, rather than use them to
derive new results. Nevertheless, many researchers (such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
1999, McCallum and Nelson 1999, Svensson 1999, Walsh 1998, 2002, and Woodford
1999) disagree, arguing that the new generation of compact macro models involves struc-
tural, not reduced-form, relationships. For this reason, we feel comfortable investigating
the Hoover-vs.-Keynes question within this framework.
Monetary policy is deﬁned in equation (3). In the ﬁrst case (equation (3a)), the
central bank's target is zero inﬂation; in the second (equation (3b)), it is a constant price
level. More speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst case, the central bank targets the expected future
inﬂation rate. Batini and Haldane (1999) and others have argued that this approach is “real
output encompassing,” because it involves the central bank putting some weight on real
output gaps in the short run. At each point in time, the central bank sets the nominal
interest rate to ensure that, at least expectationally, the zero future inﬂation target is met.
Fiscal policy is deﬁned in equations (4) and (5). Because the tax rate is constant,
the options for the government are at two polar extremes, as described in section 1. With
the Keynesian option, the government maintains a constant level of spending (as deﬁned9
in equation (4a)). This policy means that the government runs budget deﬁcits and
surpluses, letting the amount of bonds outstanding adjust according to equation (5a).
(Note that bonds are speciﬁed as long-term consols, not one-period bonds.) With the
Hoover option, the government adjusts the level of spending at each point in time to
preclude a budget deﬁcit or surplus from ever emerging (as deﬁned in equation (4b)). This
policy ensures that the debt ratio is constant (equation (5b)). The Keynesian ﬁscal policy is
feasible because it is assumed that the long-run average growth rate, , exceeds the
after-tax real interest rate. This assumption ensures that the dynamic process deﬁned in
equation (5a) is stable. This last relationship is a linear approximation of the non-linear
government ﬁnancing identity. We start with the proposition that (the bond price), times
the change in the number of bonds, equals the current deﬁcit. Then we divide by trend
GDP, substitute in the time derivative of the deﬁnition, and take a linear
approximation at full-equilibrium values (  and ).
Standard speciﬁcations of the stochastic shocks are given in equations (7), (8), and
(9).
The expectational IS relationship can be combined with either speciﬁcation for
government spending. We have:
, (1a)
with and in the Keynesian case, and and in
the Hoover case. The values for both aggregate demand parameters, and , rise as the
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model deﬁned in equations (1a), (2), either (3a) or (3b), and equations (6) to (9), to
determine the effects of changes in parameters  and  on the volatility of real output.
3. Results
To explore the built-in stability implications of the alternative rules for setting
government spending, we must derive the solution equation for the variance of real output,
and use it to determine the effects of changes in parameters and . To do this, we use
the undetermined-coefﬁcients solution method. Three trial solutions are assumed: that cur-
rent output, current price, and the end-of-period bond stock are linear functions of the pre-
vious values of and , the three current white-noise error terms, and a
constant. There are 30 reduced-form parameters to identify, but, given the recursivity that
accompanies Ricardian equivalence, fairly straightforward reduced forms emerge. (Scarth
1996 gives a detailed explanation of the undetermined coefﬁcient solution technique, and
of the derivation of asymptotic variances.)
To explain the derivations in the simplest case, we focus on inﬂation-rate targeting
with no supply shocks. The solution proceeds as follows. Solve equation (1a) for ; take
the operator through the result; use (3a) to set equal to zero; and
set equal to the result. What emerges is the central bank’s rule for setting the interest
rate, which we use in two ways. First, to identify the reduced-form coefﬁcients, we follow
McCallum and Nelson (1999) and substitute this interest-rate expression back into
equation (1a), and proceed with the undetermined coefﬁcient solution method. In general,
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In this case,  and is larger in the Hoover case. Speciﬁcally, we have:
   in the Keynesian case, and (11a)
 in the Hoover case. (11b)
Because expression (11b) exceeds (11a), this version of the model supports the
conventional wisdom that the Keynesian approach involves lower output volatility in the
face of demand shocks.
Before considering supply-side shocks and price-level targeting, we focus directly
on the equation used to set the interest rate, described above. It is given by
. (12)
According to reaction function (12), if we ignore the error term, we see that the central
bank raises the interest rate to dampen demand whenever it expects output to be rising,
even when output is below the natural rate. This policy is motivated by the bank's desire to
limit future inﬂation, but this behaviour can prolong a recession. Because parameter is
larger in the Hoover regime, we see that the central bank reacts less forcefully in this
regard when a rigid ﬁscal policy is in place. This endogeneity of monetary policy—with
the bank becoming more passive as the ﬁscal authority becomes less Keynesian—is one of
the reasons that can make it sensible for the ﬁscal authority to reject the basic lesson of the
1930s. This analysis veriﬁes that the monetary policy reaction function is dependent on
ﬁscal policy, as stressed in section 1. Nevertheless, this effect is not always strong enough
to threaten the applicability of conventional wisdom on this topic. Indeed, as we have just
seen, for demand shocks and inﬂation-rate targeting, conventional wisdom is deﬁnitely
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supported.
The results change when we examine supply-side shocks. For example, with price-
setting (cost-push) shocks, we ﬁnd
in both the Keynesian and Hoover cases.
Similarly, with natural-rate shocks, we ﬁnd
in both the Keynesian and Hoover cases. Thus, for supply shocks and inﬂation-rate
targeting, the endogenous response of the central bank to changes in the ﬁscal policy
regime is just sufﬁcient to remove the model’s support for the conventional wisdom in
favour of the Keynesian approach.
Our ﬁndings are very similar when we consider a central bank that targets the price
level. In the case of demand shocks,
(13a)
with the Keynesian ﬁscal policy, and
(13b)
with the Hoover approach. Since expression (13a) is smaller than expression (13b), the
Keynesian approach is deﬁnitely supported.
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The results are messier for supply shocks when the central bank targets the price
level. With price-setting shocks,
(14a)
in the Keynesian case, and
(14b)
in the Hoover case. Nothing can be said about the relative size of these expressions of the
volatility of output without recourse to illustrative parameter values.
Similarly, with natural-rate shocks, we ﬁnd that
(15a)
in the Keynesian case, and
(15b)
in the Hoover case.
We evaluate expressions (14) and (15) by considering representative parameter
values. We assume a value of unity for (measured as a proportion of trend GDP) so that
a plausible value for , the mean value of private consumption, is 0.8. We assume 0.25 for
the tax rate, , and (for an annual calibration of the model) we follow standard practice by
assuming a mean value for equal to 0.5. We sensitivity test by varying between 0.25
and 0.75, and we consider values between 0.1 and 0.9 for the serial correlation parameters,
and . We ﬁnd that, for all parameter values, the variance expressions are almost the
same. When the ratios of expressions (14a) to (14b) and (15a) to (15b) are calculated, the
results are almost unity. The typical outcome is 0.99. We conclude that the Keynesian
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policy is very marginally supported, but it is essentially a tie (which was the precise result
reported above for supply-side shocks with inﬂation-rate targeting). We conclude that no
signiﬁcant differences result from changing the analysis from inﬂation-rate to price-level
targeting.
The intuition behind our results is straightforward. Consider an adverse demand
shock—a leftward shift in the aggregate demand curve in price-output space. Without a
response from either the ﬁscal or monetary policy-maker, there would be a fall in the price
level. Both a Keynesian ﬁscal authority and a central bank that is committed to price
stability will react by shifting the aggregate demand curve back to the right, and these
reactions help to limit the temporary shortfall in output. The central bank cannot do a
perfect job providing this insulation in this setting, because the interest rate must be set
before the current-period shock is known. In contrast, the ﬁscal built-in stabilizers do not
require the ﬁscal policy-maker to form any expectations in advance. As a result, the
Keynesian approach provides real output with additional insulation from demand
shocks—beyond what can be expected from monetary policy. That is why conventional
wisdom is supported for demand shocks.
With an adverse supply shock (a leftward shift of the aggregate supply curve),
monetary policy faces a trade-off. The pursuit of price stability requires a policy-induced
leftward shift in aggregate demand, and this accentuates the fall in real output. As long as
the central bank pursues price stability, the ﬁscal authority is left with an instrument that
cannot accomplish what is desired (a move back to the right in the position of the
aggregate supply curve). In this instance, little is lost by adopting the Hoover strategy.15
4. Sensitivity Tests
Some macroeconomists are uncomfortable with the Calvo speciﬁcation of sticky
prices. In particular, it has been observed that there is more inﬂation inertia in the data than
is implied by the Calvo structure. One reaction is to follow Fuhrer and Moore (1995) by
including a lagged actual inﬂation rate in the aggregate supply function. Another
reaction—one which facilitates the derivation of explicit analytical solutions in the present
setting, and which introduces more sticky prices in a way that involves explicit
microfoundations (see Mussa 1981 and McCallum 1980)—is to replace the Calvo supply
function with McCallum’s “p-bar” speciﬁcation. Thus, as a sensitivity test, we replace
equation (2) with
. (2a)
With this speciﬁcation, except for price-setting shocks, prices are completely
pre-determined at each point in time. is that value of price that would make current
demand equal to the natural rate of output.
It turns out that, with this speciﬁcation for price setting, the results for
inﬂation-rate targeting and price-level targeting are identical. However, straightforward
analytical expressions emerge only for demand shocks. The reduced form for real output
is again given by equation (12). In this case, , whichever ﬁscal policy is
adopted. But the persistence parameter, a, does depend on ﬁscal policy. With the
Keynesian approach, , while in the Hoover case, . Because
there is higher persistence with Keynesian policy, the volatility of output is accentuated by
following the Keynesian approach, and conventional wisdom is not supported in this case.
As stated in section 1, to provide intuition in this case, it is helpful to think of a shift from
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the Keynesian policy to the Hoover regime as involving two components: an impact effect
and a persistence effect. In our core model (described in section 3) the Keynesian
approach involves a favourable impact effect (in the face of demand shocks). In this
instance (with McCallum’s supply function), the private sector’s nominal variable (the
price level) is just as pre-determined going into each period as the central bank’s nominal
variable (the interest rate). It appears that this precludes the Keynesian ﬁscal regime from
delivering any favourable impact effect. Also, because the Hoover policy induces the
central bank to be less aggressive in the short run, while pursuing price stability, it is this
regime that has a favourable persistence effect. That is why conventional wisdom is not
supported in this case. It is not that the impact effect of pursuing the Keynesian strategy is
“perverse,” it is that this policy involves an unfavourable persistence effect via its
inﬂuence on monetary policy. We conclude that, as in many questions in macroeconomics,
the verdict concerning a major issue (in this case, whether output volatility is higher when
the Keynesian message is ignored) is sensitive to variations in the speciﬁcation of the
short-run aggregate- supply relationship.
Thus far, our reporting of results with the “p-bar” supply function has been limited
to the implications of demand shocks. The variance expressions for the supply shocks are
very messy and not reported. However, numerical analysis (involving the same
representative parameter values described in section 3) conﬁrms that the volatility of
output is lower with the Hoover policy when there are price-setting shocks, and the result
can go either way when there are natural-rate shocks. Overall, we conclude this sensitivity
test by noting that it offers much less support for conventional wisdom.
Why is there more support for the Keynesian approach with Calvo's model of price17
setting? This is probably because prices are less sticky, and agents are more forward
looking, in the Calvo speciﬁcation. In this environment, output is less affected by demand
shocks, so the revision in the central bank's rule for setting the interest-rate (as the ﬁscal
regime changes) is less important. As a result, one of the key mechanisms in the model—
which provides competition for the traditional tendency of the Keynesian approach to lead
to more built-in stability—is made less powerful. This ensures that conventional wisdom
has a better chance of being supported.
On the basis of one additional sensitivity test, we conclude that it is not appropriate
to conjecture that the Keynesian approach will always receive more support when private
agents are more forward looking (as they are in Calvo's speciﬁcation). We have examined
a traditional descriptive IS relationship (as a replacement for the micro-based
expectational IS function), and when the resulting model is analyzed, we ﬁnd more, not
less, support for conventional wisdom (see Lam 2002). Taking a wider view, then, the
verdict concerning the Keynesian versus the Hoover approach to ﬁscal policy very much
depends on whether the model allows for both private agents and the monetary authority
to adjust their expectations and revise behaviour in the light of a change in the ﬁscal
regime.
The fact that, overall, the results are somewhat mixed makes our analysis consis-
tent with earlier studies. The early modelling exercises (for example, Gorbet and Helliwell
1971 and Smyth 1974) stressed signiﬁcant skepticism concerning the efﬁcacy of the
Keynesian approach. Our analysis provides an update (which respects the conventions of
modern work) and it suggests that there is a ﬁrmer basis for this skepticism if analysts
embrace the new neoclassical synthesis. Thus, it may not be so surprising after all that18
U.S. states with stringent rules for balanced budgets do not have higher variability of out-
put than states without such stringent rules.
5. Conclusions
With the adoption of ﬁrm annual targets for balanced budgets, ﬁscal policy in
many countries has become more rigid in recent years. This change has been motivated by
the desire to bring long-term viability and credibility to ﬁscal policy. But with the prospect
of this rigid approach being extended into the indeﬁnite future, some analysts—including
the editors of the Economist—are beginning to express concern that long-term credibility
is being gained at the expense of increased short-term volatility in real output and
employment.
To investigate this question, we have used what is now the mainstream model for
examining issues regarding stabilization policy. In the core model, we ﬁnd support for the
conventional wisdom but only as far as demand shocks are concerned. For supply shocks,
however, we ﬁnd that a Keynesian policy does not reduce the volatility of output. This
result may explain the rather limited support for the Keynesian approach that has emerged
from the empirical literature. As sensitivity tests, we have considered varying degrees of
price stickiness and forward-looking behaviour. The results are mixed. With less forward-
looking behaviour involved in aggregate demand, support for the Keynesian approach
rises. But when the expectational IS speciﬁcation is retained, the sensitivity tests lessen the
support for the Keynesian approach. With particularly sticky prices (McCallum's speciﬁ-
cation of aggregate supply), the Keynesian approach is essentially rejected; in most cases,
the Hoover approach to ﬁscal policy—which speciﬁes an annual target for balanced bud-19
gets target whatever the state of the cycle—is supported.
More deﬁnite conclusions for actual policy-making must await two developments:
empirical work that can allow better discrimination between the alternative speciﬁcations
of aggregate supply and between the alternative sources of disturbances, and analytical
work that poses this question in an open-economy environment. The current paper has
identiﬁed the key questions for future work, and demonstrated that models that reﬂect the
new paradigm in the analysis of stabilization policy may threaten the support macroecono-
mists can offer for the widespread view that the Keynesian approach to ﬁscal policy brings
lower volatility of output.20
References
Alesina, A. and T. Bayoumi. 1996. “The Costs and Beneﬁts of Fiscal Rules: Evidence
from U.S. States.” NBER Working Paper No. 5614.
Auerbach, A. and D. Feenberg. 2000. “The Signiﬁcance of Federal Taxes on Automatic
Stabilizers.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 37–56.
Batini, N. and A.G. Haldane. 1999. “Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy.” In
Monetary Policy Rules, edited by J.B. Taylor. University of Chicago Press.
Calvo, G.A., 1983. “Staggered Contracts in a Utility-Maximizing Framework.” Journal of
Monetary Economics 12: 383–98.
Christiano, L.J., 1984. “A Reexamination of the Theory of Automatic Stabilizers.” Carn-
egie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 20: 147–206.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler. 1999. “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Key-
nesian Perspective.” Journal of Economic Literature 37: 1661–1707.
Cohen, D.S. and G.R. Follette. 2000. “The Automatic Stabilizers: Quietly Doing their
Thing.” Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 64.
Fuhrer, J.C. and G.R. Moore. 1995. “Inﬂation Persistence.” Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 110: 127–159.
Goodfriend, M. and R. King. 1997. “The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of
Monetary Policy.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 12: 321–83.
Gorbett, F. and J.F. Helliwell. 1971. “Assessing the Dynamic Efﬁciency of Automatic Sta-
bilizers.” Journal of Political Economy 79: 826–845.
Hairault, J-O., P-Y. Henin, and F. Portier. 1997. Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Sta-
bility: Should We Rebuild Built-in Stabilizers? Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Kerr, W. and R.G. King. 1996. “Limits on Interest Rate Rules in the IS Model.” Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 82(2): 47–75.
King, R.G. 2000. “The New IS-LM Model: Language, Logic and Limits.” Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Review 86(3), 45–103.
Lam, J-P. 2002. “Three Essays on Built-in Stability.” PhD Thesis, McMaster University.
Levinson, A. 1998. “Balanced-Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the States.”
National Tax Journal 51(4): 715–732.
McCallum, B.T. 1980. “Rational Expectations and Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy:
An Overview.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 12: 716–746.
McCallum, B.T. 1995. “Topics in Monetary Theory and Policy.” Lectures at the Institute21
for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria.
McCallum, B.T. and E. Nelson. 1999. “An Optimizing IS-LM Speciﬁcation for Monetary
Policy and Business Cycle Analysis.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 31: 296–316.
Millar, J. 1997. “The Effects of Budget Rules on Fiscal Performance and Macroeconomic
Stabilization.” Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 97-15.
Mussa, M. 1981. “Sticky Prices and Disequilibrium Adjustment in a Rational Model of
the Inﬂationary Process.” American Economic Review 71: 1020–1027.
Ramsey, F. P. 1928. “A Mathematical Theory of Saving.” Economic Journal 38: 543–559.
Roberts, J.M. 1995. “New Keynesian Economics and the Phillips Curve.” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 27: 975–984.
Scarth, W.M. 1996. Macroeconomics: An Introduction to Advanced Methods, second edi-
tion. Toronto: The Dryden Press.
Smyth, D.J. 1974. “Built-in Flexibility of Taxation and Stability in a Simple Dynamic IS-
LM Model.” Public Finance 29: 111–113.
Svensson, L.E.O. 1999. “Inﬂation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule.” Journal of Mon-
etary Economics 43: 607–654.
Walsh, C.E. 1998. Monetary Theory and Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Walsh, C.E. 2002. “Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and Optimal Monetary Policy.”
American Economic Review. Forthcoming.
Woodford, M. 1999. “Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia.” NBER Working Paper No. 7261.